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Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: 
Privatization and Nationalization in Israel  
Introduction 
 In this article, we will shed light on the ways in which the ongoing transformation 
of land and planning policies helped maintain Israel’s settler colonialism. Specifically, 
we explain how, since the early 1990s, Israeli Government spatial policies associated 
with neoliberalism, New Public Management (NPM) and privatization have advanced the 
settler-colonial logic. We argue that the growing dominance of neoliberalism reproduces 
the settler-colonial logic rather than replace or dismantle it, as too often has been 
suggested in the literature. 
 Based on our critical analysis, we suggest using the term neo-settler colonialism 
as a concept that expresses the new regime of control, appropriation and colonization 
stemming from neoliberalism, privatization and NPM. Neo-settler colonialism, we argue, 
is a new form of regime, one that advances colonial projects while using the neo-liberal 
toolbox of concepts and policies (i.e., privatization, decentralization, deregulation, free 
market) as a mask that conceals the continued presence of old colonial logic. Our 
argument joins a new vein of scholarship that highlights the interrelationships between 
settler colonialism and neoliberalism, in general, and in Israel/Palestine, in particular. In 
this context, both Robinson (2013) and Clarno (2017) raised our awareness to the 
political-economic aspects of settler colonial regimes that combine ethnic exclusion, 
racial capitalism and territorial control that stem from a neoliberal agenda. Robinson, 
who focuses on Israel within the Green Line, highlights the paradoxical status of Israel as 
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a liberal state given its Arab citizens, who are subjects of a colonial regime, are trapped 
between formal equality and de-facto exclusion; as we illustrate here, this is still the case. 
Clarno’s notion of "Neoliberal Apartheid" expands this discussion to the 1967 Israeli-
occupied territories ("occupied territories" hereinafter), pointing to the growing 
inequality, racialized poverty, and advanced strategies for securing the powerful and 
policing the racialized poor.   
Our contribution to this growing literature is in our development of the concept of 
neo-settler colonialism and the analysis of the accumulation and allocation of spatial 
rights in Israel’s urban planning and land regime since the early 1990s, when neoliberal 
ideas gained prominence in Israel’s administration and politics (Galnoor, 2011). In this 
article, we will enhance understanding as to the ways in which said accumulation and 
allocation of spatial rights correspond to ethno-national hierarchies typical of settler-
colonial societies and promote settler-colonial goals. We focus on spatial rights in the 
land regime because it is probably the most important material, cultural and symbolic 
resource that shapes relations and politics in settler colonial society (Lloyd and Wolfe, 
2016). 
  In the first section, we review the key article themes, namely, settler colonialism, 
NPM and spatial policy, while in the next section we discuss spatial policy, 
nationalization and selective privatization in Israel. In the core sections, we critically 
analyze Israeli property rights and planning reforms, pointing to the symbiotic 
relationships between neoliberal policies and settler colonialism. In the concluding 
section, we elaborate on the concept of neo-settler colonialism as representing a distinct 
spatio-political regime. 
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Spatial Policy in the Settler Colonial Context: From primitive capitalism to 
neoliberalism 
 Settler colonialism was (and is) a process by which immigrants with the express 
purposes of territorial occupation and the formation of a new political community seize 
indigenous land, as well as wealth and opportunities, for their own political and material 
benefit (for a wider discussion, see Robinson, 2013; Veracini, 2011; Yiftachel, 2006; 
Porter, 2010; Shafir and Peled, 1998). The empirical manifestations of settler colonialism 
refer to the nexus of state (or empire) power and territorial control, mainly in "alien" 
areas within or outside the boundaries of the state, over which the dominant nation 
attempts to increase its monopoly control (Yiftachel, 2006; Porter, 2010; Shafir and 
Peled, 1998). In these "alien" areas, known as frontier or internal frontier regions, 
"primitive capitalism" served to eliminate native communities, accumulate their land and 
allocate it to settlers. Prior to leaving their homeland, the majority of these settlers were 
typically the surplus poor of industrial society (Lloyd and Wolfe, 2016).  
 But recent decades have loosened the nexus between capitalism and settler-
colonialism and brought new ideas to "the end of frontier" and "post-frontier." These 
ideas have been explored by scholars of de-colonial Australia and New Zealand, who 
emphasize "dialogue across multicultural, indigenous and settler space in Australia" 
(Anderson, 2000) or "ongoing, dialogue amongst equals" in post-settler Canadian society 
(Abu-Laban, 2001). This trend is described as a transition from "geopolitical" 
 4 
calculations to "geoeconomic" ones (Moisio and Paasi, 2013), in which the logic of 
capitalism and neoliberalism is practiced trough NPM and privatization. 
NPM represents a trend in public administration that flourished in the 1990s and 
early 2000s and, eventually, left significant footprints in contemporary administrations 
and public policy. NPM, as noted by Vigoda (2003:1), "employs knowledge and 
experiences acquired in business management… to improve efficiency, effectiveness, and 
general performance of public services in modern bureaucracies." For that reason, it is 
often linked to doctrines of economic rationalism (Hood, 1994) and viewed as a 
governmental act that realizes neoliberalism (Mel et al., 2015; Brenner and Theodore, 
2002). Consequently, and with great relevance to this article, privatization is "in the 
mainstream of the New Public Management" (Savas, 2000:1736). Importantly, 
privatization includes outsourcing public resources, functions and executive duties 
("rowing") to private organizations, as it is perceived that such tasks are better performed 
by businesses operating in competitive markets (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993); 
decentralization of public responsibilities and executive duties; the creation of 
performance-based public organizations; and the promotion of an enterprise culture 
(Galnoor et al., 2015).  
 Against the ideas of "the end of frontier" and "post-frontier," we argued elsewhere 
(Tzfadia and Yacobi, 2011) that frontier has no end and that settler colonialism is an 
ongoing practice. In Israel/Palestine, settler colonialism reinvents itself in new frontiers 
and new scales: urban, region, state. Here, we suggest that there are symbiotic 
relationships between settler colonialism and the privatization of space and planning that 
stem from a  neo-liberal agenda.  
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 We build the exploration and analysis of Israeli spatial policy, privatization and 
settler-colonialism upon three bodies of knowledge that (a) challenge the "color 
blindness" of neo-liberalism; (b) attribute to NPM the failure to expand rights to 
indigenous communities in settler-colonies; and (c) analyze democratization and 
multiculturalism in settler-colonies. Before the analysis section, an overview of Israeli 
spatial policy is provided.  
 
Spatial Policy in Israel 
 Though spatial policy covers a wide range of interpretations and meanings of land 
and planning regimes, here we apply a narrow focus that refers to the allocation and 
coordination of spatial rights between the "public" and "private" sectors. In the Israeli 
legal system, like in most countries, the ultimate true "owner" of all the country's land is 
the sovereign – either directly or via local government entities. The sovereign may 
legislate laws that bestow spatial rights on individuals, business organizations or non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), an act referred to as the "privatization of space."  
 There are two kinds of spatial rights: (a) planning and development rights 
("planning rights" hereinafter) and (b) property rights. Planning rights concern the 
regulation of land use ("zoning") and development timing, as well as the allocation of 
betterment profits. Property rights describe the owner's right to convey, devise, gift, or 
mortgage spatial rights (including planning rights). Ownership – whether private or 
public – is defined as the aggregation of all these rights. A privatized space is a space 
where aggregates of these rights, relating both to property and to planning, reside in the 
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hands of private individuals, businesses or NGOs. Such aggregates are called "fee 
simple" or "fee simple absolute," representing the highest degree possible of ownership 
of real property.  
 A nationalized space denotes sovereign possession of a broad aggregate of 
property and planning rights, with only a small portion allocated to its citizens, primarily 
by way of leasehold. Frequently, private individuals hold aggregates comprising a portion 
of those rights, with the sovereign possessing the rest. Managing the spatial rights 
partnership between the individual and the sovereign is a central component in spatial 
policy. Importantly, privatizing or nationalizing space is an ideological decision. Israel’s 
spatial policy follows this structure; it is based on the separation between planning and 
property rights and an asymmetric public-private partnership.  
 
Israeli Spatial Policy up to the 1990s 
In the first three decades following independence, Israel’s spatial policy focused on 
achieving ethno-national goals of territorial and demographic control, reflecting a settler-
colonial logic (Yiftachel, 2006; Tzfadia and Yacobi, 2011). The main elements of this 
policy were:  
(a) State ownership and control over land and development. This was achieved 
by continuing to uphold the Ottoman and British Mandate land and planning 
laws, which opened the way to nationalization of spatial rights. These laws 
enabled the nationalization of 12,000 km2 of non-arable rocky lands, of which 
2,000 km2 were under unregulated Palestinian use (Kedar and Yiftachel, 2006) 
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(Israel's area is approximately 20,800 km2 according to the 1949 Armistice 
Agreements). 
(b) Dispossession. Israel expropriated a total of 6000 km2 of Palestinian land, 
representing the property of 750,000 Palestinian refugees and some of the 
holdings of Palestinians who remained in, and eventually became citizens of, 
Israel.  
(c) Initiating a massive Jewish settlement project in borderland regions and 
those in which the Palestinians are a majority. This venture was designed to 
establish new demographic realities on lands owned by Palestinian refugees, as 
well as those designated to be part of the independent Palestinian state under the 
UN's 1947 Partition Plan for Palestine. Such "demographic engineering" 
(McGarry, 1998) has also increased Jewish presence in areas with a Palestinian 
majority. A total of 368 new villages and dozens of new towns were built (Golan, 
2005). These places provided housing and employment opportunities for 800,000 
Jewish emigrants – 55% of them from Muslim countries (Lissak, 2003).  
(d) Establishment of a durable administration of property rights. The Israel 
Land Authority (ILA) and Israeli Land Council (ILC) enforce the "Basic Law 
(constitutional): Land of Israel (1960)," which prohibits the sale of public lands, 
hence only allowing their lease. These two governmental agencies manage 
"Israel Land," i.e., public land – land owned by the State of Israel and Zionist 
organizations (such as the influential Jewish National Fund,  which is in charge 
of purchasing land, including expropriated Palestinian refugee land, and 
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allocating it to Jewish settlement projects). These nationalized, publically owned 
lands represent 93% of Israel’s territory. 
(e) Establishment of durable and centralized planning institutions. Formed as a 
result of Israel's Planning Law (1965), these institutions ensure that planning 
rights are subordinate to the National Master Plan (Alfasi, 2006).  
Israel’s spatial policy, reflective of the settler colonial context, nationalized the 
spatial rights of indigenous "enemy" populations. It also allocated limited spatial rights, 
as part of what we term "selective privatization," a system whereby the allocation of 
limited spatial rights is determined by weighing nationality, ethnicity and various other 
nationalist considerations, such as the Judaization of space, the interest to increase the 
number of Jews in "frontier" regions (these processes were duplicated in 1967 in the 
occupied territories), and the desire to inhibit the development of Arab space (Yiftachel, 
2006; Tzfadia and Yacobi, 2011; Yacobi, 2009; Benvenisti, 2000). Selective privatization 
stratifies society according to each group's relative spatial rights. At the same time, space 
becomes a reflection of each group's position in the social hierarchy. This structure is not 
based on a dichotomy between the dominant settler community and the indigenous 
population but rather on the complex hierarchy within the dominant nationality: a 
hierarchy determined by stigmas of ethnicity, political status and level of "commitment" 
to the nation. Within this complex structure, space can also serve as at tool with which to 
put populations at a disadvantage, such as newly-immigrated Jews, provided they take 
part in strengthening the state's and nation's control over that space (Tzfadia and Yacobi, 
2011).  
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This selective privatization was part and parcel of a wider national perspective 
that viewed the selective privatization of rights as a means with which to strengthen the 
state's control of space – provided that substantial spatial rights were given exclusively to 
social elites of the dominant (Jewish) nationality upon joining frontier settlements 
(Tzfadia, 2009; Trachtenberg et al., 2016). On a lower standing stood Jewish immigrants, 
whose mere presence in nationally significant space increased national control, even 
though they did not belong to the social and political elite. These immigrants improved 
their rights by becoming settlers in frontiers areas, including in the "new frontiers" in the 
territories occupied in 1967 (Newman, 2005). Palestinian who were citizens of Israel (and 
obviously the Palestinian non-citizens residing in the 1967 occupied territories) were 
excluded almost entirely from these privatization processes and were primarily subjected 
to nationalization, i.e., their lands were expropriated.  
In the 1970s, however, the nationalization of Palestinian-owned lands slowed 
down considerably, stalling altogether after the 1976 mass protests by the Arab 
population against land expropriation, known as the Land Day Protests (Holzman-Gazit, 
2007). Yet, the policy of not allocating public land for Palestinian usage continued. The 
fervor for expropriating Palestinian lands and allocating them to Jewish purposes and to 
creating a Jewish settlement system was transferred in 1967 to the occupied territories 
(for a detailed discussion, see Weizman, 2007; Newman, 2005). 
 The above paints a complex picture of Israel's spatial policy in the first three 
decades of its independence - and up to the present day in the occupied territories. On the 
one hand, spatial policy was based on large-scale nationalization of lands and planning 
rights. On the other hand, allocating spatial rights to different groups marked a course of 
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selective privatization, that is, an unequal allocation of partial spatial rights based on each 
group's affinity to the mainstream and its level of commitment to the national effort of 
gaining Jewish control over the land. In other words, while the transfer of partial rights 
could be described in terms of privatization, its main purpose, as we demonstrate, was in 
fact to reinforce the exclusive control of Jews over the territory.  
 With neoliberalism taking root in Israel (Ram, 2013), the 1980s were marked by a 
shrinking welfare state, which greatly affected the level of government fund allocation to 
public housing and farming subsidies. The arrival of one million emigrants from the 
former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("former Soviet Union" hereinafter) further 
aggravated the housing crisis. It was at this time that the geography of colonization 
shifted – the settlement project moved to the occupied territories (Newman, 2005) while 
traditional frontiers became peripheries (Tzfadia and Yacobi, 2011; Yacobi, 2009). As a 
result, the early 1990s saw deeper changes in Israel’s spatial policy, manifested in two 
interlinked avenues: property rights and development rights. We claim that both avenues 
were affected by ideas affiliated with neoliberalism and NPM, as well as by conflicts 
between interest groups − NGOs, politicians and bureaucrats − concerning efficiency, 
distributional justice, environmentalism and nationalism. These conflicts are typical of 
neo-settler colonialism because they are encapsulated in the policy orientation of 
neoliberalism and NPM, on the one hand, and the socio-geographical structure of settler-
colonialism, on the other hand.   
 Public participation and collaborative governance were enrooted in Israel’s new 
spatial policy. The new policies, reforms and proposals were debated in the media, courts 
and Parliament assemblies and committees, as well as new media and in interactions 
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between organizations. All the materials, proposals, protocols and decisions were 
available on the Internet – on Parliament and ministry websites, online newspapers, and 
professional databases.  
 It should be noted that though as members of Bimkom: Planners for Planning 
Rights ("Bimkom"), a human rights organization that participated in discussions on 
Israel’s new spatial policy as part of an ad-hoc coalition of NGOs, we were granted 
access to data on planning rights, the interpretative analysis hereunder does not represent 
Bimkom’s values and position; our research method is based on the mapping of social, 
organizational and interest groups, thematic analysis of their positions, and interpretative 
analysis of their themes (for more details, see Husting, 1999; and Scollon, 1998).                 
 
Reforming property rights 
 In the early 1990s, the Israel Land Authority and ILC designed a policy aimed at 
encouraging fast completion of residential construction projects as a means of dealing 
with the Jewish immigration wave from the former Soviet Union and solving the 
economic crisis in the agricultural sector. Jewish farmers leasing public land from the 
Israel Land Authority were previously denied the option of changing the zoning 
classification of their lands. The new 1990s policy permitted farmers to rezone 
agricultural land as commercial or residential and, thereby, to benefit from the property's 
rise in value. The ILC and the farmers were of the opinion that this change of policy 
would enable farmers indebted as a result of the economic crisis that hit the agricultural 
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sector in the 1980s to pay their debts to Israeli banks. This privatization step was, 
therefore, meant to aid economic development.  
 But Ehud Olmert, then Chairman of the ILC and later Prime Minister of Israel, 
gave a different reasoning for this privatization, linking it to ethno-national interests 
(quote from Bashan, 18 December, 2003H):  
"These people, without whom Israel would not be what it has become, 
deserve this... I remember well who they are... the spearhead of the Jewish 
People... They are among Israel's great strengths, and we are all morally 
indebted to them... So, what can we give that generation of pioneers, of 
warriors, who broke the earth with their bare hands and created facts on 
the ground, drawing the circle that made Israel possible?... in my opinion 
[they] should receive certain benefits." 
 These special benefits stirred public outrage, which found expression in various 
objections and demands, as can be gathered from two sources: (a) digitized data of 
primary and secondary sources concerning ILC decisions and petitions against the 
Council; and (b) protocols of Israeli Parliament assemblies and committees. We socially 
and organizationally mapped and thematically analyzed all this data: The Jewish farming 
sector called for an increase in benefits; the urban sector cautioned that the new zonings 
policy will prompt an outflow of businesses from cities to rural settlements; organizations 
for social change demanded the introduction of distributive justice in Israel lands; the 
Arab population demanded equitable reallocation of Israel Land; the business sector 
called to free land for residential development; environmental organizations urged to 
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cease expanding urban space and suburbanizing open areas; NGOs for social change 
advocated closing admission committees in new neighborhoods that were built on the 
rezoned farmland; banks argued that increasing farmer land rights will enable them to 
pay back their loans; and public housing tenants appealed to increase their property 
rights.  
 In response to this outcry, in 2004, the Israeli government set up a public 
committee (the Gadish Committee) tasked with assessing the various demands and 
concerns and making recommendations for Israel Land Authority reform (Gadish, 2005). 
The committee's main recommendation was to register urban lands that were leased for 
housing as private property; that is, to privatize all property rights in urban lands to their 
leaseholders. It also pointed out the need for additional regulation of planning rights. In 
other words, the committee sought to privatize property rights and to nationalize planning 
rights.  
 Another important recommendation focused on Jewish National Fund lands 
(which are part of Israel Land) and on the Fund's representation in the ILC, which 
reached 50% at the time and was based on an ethno-territorial logic. The committee was 
of the opinion that this logic had become "injurious to the general public, holding back 
development and growth" (Gadish, 2005:36). It should be noted that most Jewish 
National Fund lands are in high-demand areas, so their current use as a tool for promoting 
the Judaization of space is marginal. This, we argue, is exactly what made it possible for 
the committee to criticize Jewish National Fund over-representation in the ILC and to 
suggest reducing it to one sixth of the total, matching the Fund's relative ownership in 
Israel Land. The committee also called for transferring ownership in undeveloped Jewish 
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National Fund lands to the state in return for full monetary reimbursement (Gadish, 
2005). This was the committee's way of stopping Palestinian discrimination, a 
consequence of the Jewish National Fund’s refusal to lease its lands to non-Jews (for 
more details on this issue, see Tzfadia, 2008). Noteworthy though is the fact that the 
committee did not suggest compensating Palestinian citizens whose lands were 
expropriated and transferred to the Jewish National Fund.  
 The Gadish Committee recommendations were approved by the government in 
June 2005. The recommendations served as a partial basis for a 2009 proposal made by 
the government for a land reform bill (Israel Lands Administration Law (Amendment 7), 
2009). The proposed reform permitted the transfer of ownership of developed urban lands 
from ILA to leaseholders (until then, apartments could be privately owned but the land on 
which they were built was leased from the Israel Land Authority). The same principle 
was applied, to a more limited extent, to industrial lands. This was not a revolutionary 
change in terms of privatization, as apartment owners in Israel's cities had already 
enjoyed various property rights on lands they leased: the right of possession and the right 
to transfer and sell, mortgage and bestow enjoyment rights.  
 An important paragraph in the land reform bill focused on the NPM style of 
reorganizing the Israel Land Authority – which emphasizes outsourcing, privatization, 
output measurement, efficiency, small organizational structure, professionalism and a 
politics-free environment, as detailed in the bill proposal's "explanation note." The 
proposal also suggested reducing the number of ILC board members from 18 to eight, in 
line with the desire to promote de-politicization and professionalization, but also as a 
means to reduce the influence of the Jewish National Fund. 
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 We assume that the importance of the committee and subsequent reform was 
reflected more in the discourse and conflicts that they spurred than in any practical 
changes they made. For the first time in modern Israeli history, a government called to 
privatize National Land, which goes against the letter of Israel’s first basic law1, Land of 
Israel (1960), which in its first paragraph states: "The ownership of Israel lands… shall 
not be transferred, whether by sale or in any other manner." Together with the proposal to 
reduce the influence of the Jewish National Fund, the government challenged, to some 
extent, the logic that had long served as the basis for nationalizing land, and explored the 
idea of subjecting land management to an economic logic.  
However, these concepts, which may symbolize the end of colonialism and 
nationalization of space, faced massive opposition over serious concerns regarding, in 
part, social inequality and environmental protection, but mainly nationalistic interests. It 
started with a refusal by the Parliament to approve a paragraph that attempted to privatize 
undeveloped lands, due partly to pressures exerted by an ad-hoc coalition of human 
rights, social and environmental NGOs and Jewish nationalist organizations. As board 
members of Bimkom, which  participated in this coalition, we were privy to the internal 
discussions and letters mailed to politicians and officials. In these communications, 
nationalists voiced their opinion that this reform signified the end of colonialism because 
it subjected the land to capital logic. This idea was the main reason why the Jewish 
National Fund refused to implement the reform over its land and, of course, refused to 
transfer ownership in its undeveloped lands to the state in return for full monetary 
reimbursement. The ratio of Jewish National Fund representatives in the ILC was 
                                                          
1 Basic laws are the constitutional laws of the State of Israel. 
 16 
reduced to 2 out of 10. The human rights and social justice NGOs, on their part, claimed 
that the reform would extend social gaps. And finally, the NPM style of reorganization 
encountered resistance from the Israel Land Authority’s labor union, which prevented the 
implementation of major parts of the reform as protest against the reorganization (State 
Comptroller, 2014).     
 The land reform was presented as morally significant and as an enabler of free 
market development by way of privatization and de-bureaucratization. But a counter-
argument, put forward by Palestinian activists, was that the reform largely preserves the 
achievements of nationalization: ownership of public lands (most of which, as 
abovementioned, were expropriated from absentees or declared public property) and 
Israel Land Authority lands (previously owned by absentees) was only transferred to 
urban leaseholders, most of whom were middle- and upper-class Jews. The reform, thus, 
created a new model of privatization of land rights – but remained deeply rooted in 
nationalist-territorial values (for more on this issue, see Tzfadia and Yacobi, 2011).  
 The Palestinian citizens of Israel expressed ambivalence toward the reform. On 
the one hand, they supported the claim that Jews were merely arguing among themselves 
whether the lands they had once taken from Palestinians should now remain under public 
ownership and management benefitting Jews or, rather, be given to Jewish landlords. On 
the other hand, they supported the reform and refused to join the socially motivated 
struggle against it, claiming that a privatized land market might still be less 
discriminatory than the reality of nationalized land, as it would correspond with the 
"color blindness" of a market economy (Jabareen, 2009; Ziv and Shamir, 2003). Both 
arguments were made within the context that urban properties in Arab population centers 
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were privately owned in any case, a remnant of non-nationalized Palestinian land, and 
that Israel Land Authority seldom allocated public land to Arabs and their towns (Yacobi, 
2009).  
Reforming Planning Rights 
 Israel's planning system is built hierarchically – from the national through the 
district down to the local committees – with each level formulating its own outline plans, 
subject to those devised higher up. National outline plans, produced by the National 
Planning and Construction Committee, are authorized directly by the government (Alfasi, 
2006). Under this framework, the national committee can make extremely detailed 
outline plans, which do not leave much room for local initiative. Alternatively, it can 
make more general plans and leave the specifics to local planning bodies and quasi non-
governmental organizations. The first approach should be considered a nationalization of 
planning rights, as the national committee decides on the exact nature of development of 
every land unit; in Israel, as detailed above, this approach corresponds with colonial 
logic. An approach of the second kind would be considered a privatization of planning 
rights, because it leaves the exact nature of development to local negotiations between 
contractors, property owners, tenants and local planners.  
 In this context, the first decades of planning in Israel served ideas of Judaization, 
territorial control, and frontier settlements (Efrat, 2004; Yiftachel, 2006; Tzfadia and 
Yacobi, 2011). Yet this changed in the 1990s, when the national planning system was 
faced with the great former Soviet Union immigration wave (Alterman, 2002). National 
Outline Plans 31 (1993) and 35 (2005) marked a fundamental change in the balance 
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between privatization and nationalization of planning rights. Both plans were based on 
similar conceptions of Israel: as a cluster of four metropolitan areas; as having a 
developed economy that depends on the different specialties of each metropolitan area; as 
a country marching towards an era of peace, where the significance of security and 
colonial considerations diminishes and that of economic and environmental 
considerations grows; and as a society that wishes to promote private and local initiatives 
(Shachar, 1998). Despite certain differences between their practical approaches, National 
Outline Plans 31 and 35 both gave wider planning rights to entrepreneurs cooperating 
with local authorities.  
 Of utmost significance is the declaration made in both plans that there is no more 
room for new settlements – the symbol of Jewish colonization. National Outline Plan 31 
asserted that the effort to house former Soviet Union immigrants does not allow for 
investing energy in new settlements. National Outline Plans 35 stated that new 
settlements go against the economic, social and environmental interests of Israel.  
We doubt, however, that these National Outline Plans symbolize the end of 
colonization. There are three main reasons for our uncertainty. First, Israel’s Planning 
Law and National Outline Plans are not applicable to the occupied territories (except for 
East Jerusalem, where the Israeli law is enforced), where Jewish colonization still 
flourishes (Yacobi, 2016). Second, the ban on building new settlements provoked a 
protest by nationalist organizations and politicians who believed that settlement of land  
is what Jews should strive for in Israel. As a result, the first amendment in National 
Outline Plan 35 permitted the establishment of new settlements in frontier regions. And, 
indeed, dozens of new settlements have been approved since in frontier and internal 
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frontier areas, i.e., in regions in which Palestinians compose the majority. Only a few of 
those built were due to environmental concerns, financial reasons or public protest. Third, 
National Outline Plans 31 and 35 limited the possibility of expanding Palestinian 
localities, and even prevented development within them, calling instead for an 
agglomeration of economic activities in the metropolitan hubs – none of which fall under 
the jurisdiction of Arab localities (Jabareen, 2015). 
   Nevertheless, the shift in the national planning approach paved the way to a 
planning reform all over Israel that spanned two decades. Since 1995, two years after the 
approval of National Outline Plan 31, the Israeli Parliament passed several amendments 
to the Planning and Building Law: 43 (passed in 1995); 76 (passed in 2006); 90 (never 
passed, but served as a basis for a 2009 government proposal for a brand-new Planning 
and Building Law, which was rejected by the Parliament); and 102 (passed in 2013 as an 
alternative to approving the proposal for a new law). These amendments' basic principles, 
as Israel's High Court of Justice laid out, are:  
 "[T]he emptying of powers from vessel to vessel, that is: decentralizing various 
powers from district committees to local ones... the purpose being: to shorten 
planning procedures and improve their efficiency... to give independent powers to 
local committees, to approve local outline plans, and even detailed plans on 
certain issues, without needing the (previously required) consent of district 
committees" (H.C. 5145/00. Local Planning and Building Commission for Hof 
HaSharon vs. the Minister of the Interior et al.). 
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Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu added some NPM flavor to it – this time in 
relation to the 2009 proposed new Planning and Building Law: "The reform… seeks to 
remove bureaucratic obstacles, to simplify and shorten approval processes, and to 
increase transparency in an effort to boost economic growth" (Wrobel, 2010).  
 Eyal Gabbai, then Director General of the Israeli Prime Minister's Office, 
described the desired change as follows: 
״Local committees will get professional reinforcements and the powers of district 
committees will be shared, to some extent, with local committees. … The national 
committee will be in charge of the larger vision... Dysfunctional [local planning] 
committees will be dispersed and, potentially, replaced with interim ones. So, 
local committees are receiving powers and responsibilities, but these powers will 
be taken away in cases where they cannot handle them״ (Tomer, 2010). 
 Localism indeed holds numerous opportunities for communal empowerment and 
local democracy. Planning closer to home may also disregard national-territorial values 
and endorse environmental and economic ones. In this sense, the passing of amendments 
43, 76 and 102 signified an unprecedented development: If previously, planning policies 
were grounded in the Government's desire to increase its own control, partly for 
promoting national-territorial values, the amendment gave extra weight to economic 
values, as outlined by National Outline Plans 31 and 35. 
 Careful inspection of the bill, however, leads us to conclude that this reform does 
not promote decentralization, self-government and color-blindness, and does not signify 
an end to colonial motivations. Rather, it preserves some of the ideas of denying spatial 
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rights to minorities, mainly from Palestinian local authorities. This conclusion rests upon 
several critical observations:   
1. Decentralization was made possible primarily in "strong," necessarily Jewish 
municipalities – having both the required land reserves available for development 
and the resources to promote independent professional planning initiatives that 
would fit the requirements set by the amendments. The amendments provided 
these particular local authorities with two important budgetary levers: First, a 
potential for increased municipal taxes, inherent in the power to make local 
zoning changes. Thus, "strong" local authorities changed zonings from industrial 
or housing to commercial, thereby increasing their municipal tax income. The 
amendments further allowed municipalities to increase population density, which 
also held the potential for lucrative financial rewards. The second budgetary lever 
was revenue from betterment taxes – a consequence of rising land values due to 
changed outline plans. The betterment tax, which can amount to one half of the 
total increase in land value, also goes into the local authority's coffers. Thus, the 
broadening of planning powers at the local authority level increased land value 
and incomes in “strong” local authorities.  
2. An additional issue raised in the amendments was the involvement of local 
authorities in determining the type of housing to be built in their jurisdiction. 
Large apartments and single-family detached homes were – and still are – an 
important means of attracting populations of a higher socioeconomic standing. By 
preventing the construction of smaller and mostly cheaper apartments, many local 
authorities were able not only to dissuade weaker populations from settling in 
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their jurisdiction but also push such resident populations out – to less expensive 
localities (Blank, 2002). Excluding poorer populations obviously benefits the 
financial position of local authorities, as it makes municipal taxes easier to collect, 
retarded the need to offer discounts or provide welfare services, and, last but not 
least – creates a positive image that further attracts businesses and raises the value 
of property.  
 These observations indicate that the amendments are rooted in settler-colonial 
logic and allocate resources accordingly: While amendment 43 seemingly allowed every 
municipality to use its planning powers to strengthen its economic position, amendment 
76 stipulated that the additional powers would only be given to qualified local 
committees. That is, supplementary powers were conditioned on the ability of local 
authorities to establish fully professional local committees and to bring plans to fruition. 
Amendment 102 gave the Minister of Interior (and from 2015 the Minister of Finance) 
the authority to dismiss local planning committees that do not qualify for extended 
powers, and appoint in their stead interim committees that are subject to the Minister's 
authority, thus wielding vast powers over local planning, uninhibited by mayors or local 
councils.   
 It other words, only municipalities that were strong to begin with were able to 
benefit from the new amendments. Smaller and poorer municipalities, lacking the means 
to operate local planning committees and initiate independent plans, could not take 
advantage of these new levers in order to increase their revenues and could not compete 
against richer municipalities for stronger populations (Razin and Hazan, 2013). None of 
the 73 local Arab authorities were able to meet the said requirements.  
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3. The issue of regional committees is yet another aspect of the reform that testifies 
that the age of colonization has not come to an end. According to the current law, 
regional committees are in charge of more than a single local authority and are 
subject to the Minister of Interior's powers of appointment and dispersal. The 
relative share of Arab local authorities in regional committees is especially large: 
66 out of 73 local Arab authorities are included in regional planning committees, 
while about half of the Jewish local authorities (74 out of 148) operate 
independent local committees. The reform gives extensive powers to the Minister 
of Interior in appointing members to regional committees and in determining the 
nature of their plans. It, therefore, seems that the government's control over Arab 
municipalities will not change much in the near future. 
 What is new in settler-colonialism, beyond the NPM style of partial and selective 
decentralization? Perhaps it is the mask of democratization and deliberation processes 
that has managed to prevent the ratification of the new law and the adoption of radical 
ideas of power concentration. For example, the proposal for the new 2009 Planning and 
Building Law was cancelled due to massive protest against it, and was subsequently 
reframed as amendment 102 to the 1965 Planning Law. The struggle surrounding the bill 
concerns values shared by some Parliament members, as well as environmental NGOs 
cooperating for this purpose under the Roof Organization for Responsible Planning. 
Opponents to the bill also include contractor organizations, heads of local authorities and 
municipal coalitions. The struggle is waged in animated meetings of the joint committee 
of the Parliament, in courts, in the press and in the halls of Government and Parliament. 
The dust has not yet settled, but this much is clear: The reform, amendment or new bill 
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continues the trend of transferring regional powers – mainly development rights – to local 
authorities based on economic logic. But this very logic highlights the persistent 
inequality between local authorities, whose roots can be traced back to the ethno-national 
logic of territorial control.  
 
Conclusions 
 In this article, we critically analyze the changes that have taken place over the 
years in the interplay between nationalization and selective privatization of space in 
Israel. We frame the discussion in concrete historical, political and contemporary 
contexts. As we have shown, the dynamics of the privatization of space in Israel cannot 
be understood independently of a colonial political and geographical framework; this 
framework accounts for the state's control over the supposed "release" of market forces, 
which, in effect, is just another instance of state direction.  
 Our findings highlight the symbiotic relationships between neoliberal policies and 
settler colonialism. This relationship is expressed in land and planning reforms, which 
while presented as an attempt to create an efficient and liberating planning system and an 
economically effective "planning machine", are revealed by our critical analysis to form a 
spatio-political regime that articulates territorial dominance. Another layer of 
understanding of the dynamics of settler colonialism comes from the insight that rather 
than present the reforms as a result of top-down commands, they are masked by their 
presentation as deliberate processes that take place in a variety of public spheres. 
Different types of actors participate in public debates, decision-making, petitions, protests 
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etc., which convey a semblance of democracy to colonial settler-societies. These two 
vectors, hidden behind the veil of democracy, do not contradict but actually complement 
each other in what we have defined as neo-settler colonialism. 
 As discussed, we base the notion of neo-settler colonialism on three bodies of 
knowledge: neoliberalism, NPM and democratization. The first body of knowledge, 
neoliberalism, is probably best expressed by Harvey’s (2005) phrase "freedom’s just 
another word", that is, the belief that human well-being can best be advanced by 
maximizing entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by 
private property rights, individual liberty, free markets and free trade – without any 
reference to ethnicity or race. Indeed, National Master Plans 31 and 35 embody this 
belief, as do the amendments to the Planning and Building Law from 1995 onwards. 
However, as has been proven so many times, neoliberalism increases social gaps. It 
benefits the haves and harms the have-nots. Neoliberalism, as Duggan (2012:3) states, 
"organizes material and political life in terms of race, gender and sexuality… nationality, 
or ethnicity and religion." As we have shown, although neoliberalism de-contextualizes 
contemporary social gaps from socially constructed hierarchies, it also reinforces these 
gaps – which are rooted in its settler-colonial structure.  
 The second body of knowledge we discuss is NPM in settler-colonial societies, 
which refers to neoliberal governmental frameworks that maintain hierarchical and power 
relation structures (Mel et al., 2015; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Against the idea that 
NPM represents a new form of government that promises freedom and human well-
being, Strakosch (2015:3) argues that "ongoing settler colonial hierarchies have been 
rearticulated through, rather than revived or transcended by, neoliberal frameworks".  
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 The Israeli spatial policy reforms actually adopted NPM narratives: efficiency, 
economic growth, minimum bureaucracy and initiatives, as well as practices of 
decentralization, deregulation and privatization. These narratives presented an alternative 
to previous ones of national control over space, judaization and the prevention of Arab 
locality expansion (Shachar, 1998). Nationalization has been viewed as a detriment to the 
business and investment sectors, one that  would disadvantage a country trying to 
compete in the global economy (Panitch and Gindin, 2012). Yet a critical analysis of 
Israel's reforms reveals, as Strakosch (2015) argues, that these new practices rearticulate 
settler colonial hierarchies: Decentralization is a benefit for "efficient" and resourceful 
localities, i.e., Jewish cities and rural localities that had benefitted in the past thanks to 
their "contribution" to spatial Judaization (see Blank, 2002). Arab localities, generally 
portrayed as unsuccessful and inefficient bureaucracies, are prevented from reaping these 
benefits while being deceived that said policy has nothing to do with the colonial ideal of 
who has power over the use and development of land. Indeed, be it in the past or in 
present-day, settler-colonies have no intention of giving-up territorial control, only the 
practices have been rearticulated.  
 The third body of knowledge focuses on democratization, which is linked with 
multiculturalism in settler-colonial societies. In recent decades, settler-colonies have had 
to redesign their own appearance. Instead of accentuating territorial control, 
nationalization and priority of the dominant nation, settler states have adopted formal and 
informal multiculturalism – a set of ideas on shared society, distributional justice and the 
legitimacy to counter moral and political claims of a wide range of marginalized groups, 
mainly indigenous communities (Anderson, 2000; Abu-Laban, 2001, Porter, 2010). 
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Multiculturalism creates a semblance of democracy through participation or collaborative 
governance (Innes and Booher, 2004), asymmetrical autonomy and self-government 
(Kymlica, 1995) and NGOization of space (Yacobi, 2011). 
 Indeed, the reforms in Israel’s spatial policy, together with the political and social 
debates and activism, enfolded many acts (detailed above) that can easily be identified as 
democratic and multicultural. But there are several challenges to the perceived notion that 
these acts are truly democratic and multicultural, as evidenced by the analytical 
distinction between the two modes of politics: recognition and redistribution (Fraser and 
Honneth 2003). There are two distinct concerns here. The first is that the existence of 
ethnic diversity reduces social solidarity, such as the inability to create a class-based 
protest against land reform in light of the Palestinian NGOs' support of privatization – 
similar to the collaboration of the business sector and Jewish social activists with 
nationalist movements to block privatization. The second is that multiculturalism and 
deliberation fail to confront the generative roots of colonialism and its distributional logic 
and, in most cases, cannot confront and compensate for unjust distribution (Coulthard, 
2014). The Israeli planning reform decentralized power and authority to local level 
politics due to the belief that this scale is appropriate for democratization, recognition and 
deliberation. Yet, no matter how democratic planning is at the local level, the bottom line 
is that it is a distributor of resources that have been allocated according to colonial logic. 
Furthermore, as the logic of neoliberalism rarely contributes to distributional justice – it 
thus reinforces localities in Israel that had been beforehand privileged by the colonial 
regime. 
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